Stats
Economic growth in cultural sector:
In 2010, 29,000 businesses and enterprises were established in the cultural sector in Berlin (that is 42% more than in 2000), with 223,000 employees and 22,4 billion Euros in revenue. That means: 14% of Berlin's workers produced 15% revenue of the total Berlin economy. (Berlin Boxx, Business Magazin, November / Dezember
2011)
For more statistical data, see Berlin - A Success Story: Facts and Statistics
For more statistical data, see Berlin - A Success Story: Facts and Statistics
Tourism
By the late 1990s, Berlin was the first tourist destination in Germany and the third most visited city in Europe after Paris and London – a rank it has maintained to date. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.126)
Berlin Senate
The executive power in Berlin is shared between the mayor who is elected by the House of Representatives and the Senate (Senat), i.e. the government and administration of the Land. The Senate is organized in sectoral departments which are politically led by a Senator appointed by the Mayor. Each Senator leads his or her own administration independently – within the policy orientation voted by the House of Representatives – and is politically accountable for the decisions made in his or her field. The Mayor is a ‘first among equals’ (Wollmann, 2004, p.154) who steers government policy in close cooperation with the Senators, plays a mediation role within the ruling coalition and represents Berlin to the outside world. The Senatskanzlei (Senate Chancellery) is the administrative team of the Mayor. It is in charge of the political coordination of the Senate’s work, of cooperation with the Federal government and other German Länder, of media and public relations, of relationships with the EU, of the representation of Berlin abroad and of relations with partner cities. It is also responsible, since the mid-2000s, for cultural policy. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, pp.77-78)
Politics
The coalition between CDU and SPD formed after the Berlin elections of December 1990 governed Berlin for one decade under the leadership of Mayor Eberhard Diepgen. The Grand Coalition was united around a broad consensus to promote Berlin’s transformation into a service metropolis of European or even global status. The premises of that vision had been initiated by the SPD in the previous “Red-Green’ coalition, through the decisions made with regard to the redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz as a high-profile business and entertainment district. The new mayor of Berlin explicitly advocated the shift to a new entrepreneurial urban politics, which would prioritize the attraction of external capital, investors and labour force to the city (Krätke, 1992; Häuβermann and Strom, 1994; Heeg, 1998). [...] Various measure and policies were implemented by the Grand Coalition in the first half of the 1990s to facilitate the process of private investment in real estate. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, pp.90-91)
Public subsidies managed by public redevelopment agencies were combined with tenant protection and rent cap measures to encourage renewal without displacement, under the influence of an active tenants’ movement which campaigned under the motto ‘Wir bleiben alle’ (’We are all staying’) (Rada, 1997; Bernt, 2003). In the second half of the 1990s, public subsidies were decreased and rent caps were gradually abandoned. Housing renewal methods shifted in favour of privately financed modernization by professional property developers. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.92)
Public subsidies managed by public redevelopment agencies were combined with tenant protection and rent cap measures to encourage renewal without displacement, under the influence of an active tenants’ movement which campaigned under the motto ‘Wir bleiben alle’ (’We are all staying’) (Rada, 1997; Bernt, 2003). In the second half of the 1990s, public subsidies were decreased and rent caps were gradually abandoned. Housing renewal methods shifted in favour of privately financed modernization by professional property developers. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.92)
Debt
The cessation of Federal government’s subsidies to Berlin in 1994 and the integration of Berlin into the system of financial redistribution between German Länder in 1995 led to a net loss of income amounting to 30 per cent of the city’s budget between 1993 and 1994 (Storm, 2001, p.87). Additionally, the steady decline in Berlin’s GPD between 1996 and 2005 let to decreasing tax income, while the sharp increase in unemployment fuelled the increase in social and welfare expenditure. The generous tax write-off schemes for real-estate investors which had been put in place by the Grand Coalition in the early 1990s contributed further to the shrinking of the public authorities’ tax income (Krätke, 2004a). Combined, these trends led to a rapid increase in the city’s debt, which rose from €10 billion in 1991 to €40 billion in 2001 and €55 billion in 2004 (SenFin, 2006).
By the end of the 2000s, three-fifth of the city’s debt of €50 billion covered ‘the social costs of the real estate and banking activities of Berlin’s politicians’ (Krätke, 2004b, p.526). [...] The city of Berlin thus had to tackle its debt without Federal help. The new Red-Red coalition consequently adopted a strict programme of ‘fiscal discipline’ with the aim of attaining a balanced operating budget (excluding interest payments) by 2006. This involved massive cuts in public expenditure affecting welfare payments, public services, education, research and culture. In 2005 public expenditure per head was 89 percent of its 1995 level (SenFin, 2006). The number of employees in the public administration fell from 145,000 in 2001 to 114,000 in 2006 (SenInn, 2007) (against 207,000 in 1991). The new governing coalition pursued the transfer of public services to private organizations (e.g. Kindergarten) and intensified the reforms of the local public administration which been initiated by the Grand Coalition. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.224-225)
In 2010 the debt of the Land of Berlin amounted to approximately €60 billion. The budget of the city stood at €20 billion. 12 per cent of which used each year to pay the interests of the debt. The drastic measures for budget consolidation meant that in 2007 a budget surplus was registered for the first time since unification, but this did not last long: from the following year onwards the budget was in deficit again. The long-term prospects for the city’s finances are not set to improve significantly in the years to come, in part due to the continuous lack of strong economic growth as well as the forthcoming phasing out of Federal funding programmes supporting East German Länder such as Aufbau Ost (its end in 2019 will represent a planned loss of income of one-tenth of the city’s budget). (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.226)
By the end of the 2000s, three-fifth of the city’s debt of €50 billion covered ‘the social costs of the real estate and banking activities of Berlin’s politicians’ (Krätke, 2004b, p.526). [...] The city of Berlin thus had to tackle its debt without Federal help. The new Red-Red coalition consequently adopted a strict programme of ‘fiscal discipline’ with the aim of attaining a balanced operating budget (excluding interest payments) by 2006. This involved massive cuts in public expenditure affecting welfare payments, public services, education, research and culture. In 2005 public expenditure per head was 89 percent of its 1995 level (SenFin, 2006). The number of employees in the public administration fell from 145,000 in 2001 to 114,000 in 2006 (SenInn, 2007) (against 207,000 in 1991). The new governing coalition pursued the transfer of public services to private organizations (e.g. Kindergarten) and intensified the reforms of the local public administration which been initiated by the Grand Coalition. (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.224-225)
In 2010 the debt of the Land of Berlin amounted to approximately €60 billion. The budget of the city stood at €20 billion. 12 per cent of which used each year to pay the interests of the debt. The drastic measures for budget consolidation meant that in 2007 a budget surplus was registered for the first time since unification, but this did not last long: from the following year onwards the budget was in deficit again. The long-term prospects for the city’s finances are not set to improve significantly in the years to come, in part due to the continuous lack of strong economic growth as well as the forthcoming phasing out of Federal funding programmes supporting East German Länder such as Aufbau Ost (its end in 2019 will represent a planned loss of income of one-tenth of the city’s budget). (Claire Colomb, Staging the New Berlin, 2012, p.226)
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